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Abstract. In cyber-physical systems sensors data should be anonymized at the
source. Local data perturbation with differential privacy guarantees can be used,
but the resulting utility is often (too) low. In this paper we contribute an algorithm
that combines local, differentially private data perturbation of sensor streams with
highly accurate outlier detection. We evaluate our algorithm on synthetic data. In
our experiments we obtain an accuracy of 80% with a differential privacy value
of  = 0.1 for well separated outliers.
1 Introduction
In cyber-physical systems, e.g. smart metering, connected cars or the Internet of Things,
sensors stream data to a sink, e.g. a database in the cloud, which is commonly controlled
by a different entity. The subjects observed by the sensors have a vested interest in
preserving their privacy towards the other entity. A technical means to preserve privacy
is to anonymize the data (at the source). However, the data itself may be personally
identifiable information as was, e.g., shown for smart meter readings [10]. Local data
perturbation with differential privacy guarantees [5] can be used to protect against such
exploitation and can be applied by the sensor. However, the resulting utility in this non-
interactive model is often much lower than in the interactive, trusted curator model of
differential privacy. So far, successful, differentially private outlier detection was only
achieved in the interactive model [8, 17, 18].
Our algorithm contributed in this paper shows that local data perturbation of sensor
streams combined with highly accurate outlier detection is feasible. We achieve this
by using a relaxed version of differential privacy and a privacy-preserving correction
method. The relaxation is to adapt the sensitivity to the set of data excluding the outliers
[4]. We assume a scenario where outliers are subject to subsequent investigation which
requires precise data, e.g. a broken power line or water pipe. Our privacy-preserving
correction method uses distribution of trust between a correction server and an analyst
server (the database). The correction server never learns the real measurements, but
only the random noise added by the data perturbation (with indices of data values). The
analyst server never learns the random noise, but only indices of data values whose
outlier status – false positives and false negatives – the correction server has adjusted3.
3 The analyst server learns also parameters about the data set which are however computable
from the output of the algorithm.
The result provides an improved outlier detection and preserves differential privacy
towards the data analyst, since data perturbation is applied at the source (independent
of the algorithm). Furthermore, the correction server never learns enough information
to reconstruct any of the data.
Our non-interactive data perturbation is applied once for all subsequent analyses
and does not require a privacy budget distributed over a series of queries which is crit-
ical in many applications [6, 20]. We evaluate our algorithm on synthetic data. In our
experiments we detect 80% of outliers in a subset of 10% of all points with a differential
privacy value of  = 0.1 on data sets with well separated outliers. Our error correction
method has an average runtime of less than 40 milliseconds on 100,000 data points.
2 Related Work
We perform outlier detection on sensor data perturbed with relaxed differential privacy
at the source and correct the detection errors due to perturbation. We are not aware of
any related work on this specific problem, however, there has been extensive work in
related areas: releasing differentially private topographical information, relaxations of
differential privacy and separation of outliers and non-outliers.
In the area of releasing topological proximities under differential privacy a founda-
tion for privately deriving cluster centers is provided in [1, 16, 21]. Their approaches
have two drawbacks due to the use of the interactive model: The complex determina-
tion of  for an assumed number of iterations until convergence and the limitation to
aggregated cluster centers. An approach towards non-interactive differential privacy in
clustering through a hybrid approach of non-interactive and interactive computations is
formulated in [22]. A foundation for increasing differential privacy utility by sensitivity
optimizations is introduced in [17]. Furthermore, the authors formulate a differentially
private approach to release near optimal k-means cluster centers with their sample-and-
aggregate framework. In [18] the sample-and-aggregate approach is extended to detect
the minimal ball B enclosing approximately 90% of the points; everything outside B
is presumed to be an outlier. Their approach is formulated in the interactive model and
requires to apply the calculated ball B to the original data for outlier identification. The
work in [8] is similar in the desire to produce a sanitized data set representation allow-
ing an unlimited series of adaptive queries. Their non-interactive approach for produc-
ing private coresets (a weighted subset of points capturing geometric properties of its
superset) suitable for k-means and k-median queries is proven theoretically efficient,
but does not allow to identify individual outliers. Chances for great accuracy improve-
ments in differentially private analysis are identified in [18] if outliers were identified
and removed before analysis.
Several relaxations for differential privacy have been suggested. Either by adapting
the sensitivity [17], additional privacy loss [3], by distinguishing between groups with
different privacy guarantees [11, 14], or by relaxing the adversary [19, 23]. In [3] (,δ)-
differential privacy is presented where the privacy loss does not exceed  with proba-
bility at most 1 − δ where δ is negligible. For our scenario in which outliers should be
treated as a separate group, δ would become very large. Instead, we argue for a noise
distribution with different  guarantees for outliers and non-outliers. By relaxing the
assumed adversary knowledge about the data the work [23] shows that utility gains in
Genome-Wide Association Studies are achievable. This relaxation is not discriminating
between different groups found in the data set as in our case. Additionally, we avoid
relaxing the adversary and instead decrease the privacy guarantee for outliers.
The discussion on separation of outliers and non-outliers has been addressed in [11]
by questioning the equal right for privacy for all (i.e. citizens vs. terrorists). Their work
is close to ours in enforcing privacy guarantees to differentiate between a protected
and a target subpopulation. However, in [11] the original data is maintained and query
answers are perturbed interactively with a trusted curator. We avoid giving access to
original data and enforce perturbation at the source. It is concluded in [15] that sparse
domains incorporate a high risk of producing outliers in the perturbed data and thus
argue for the need of outlier identification and removal in the unperturbed data set. In
contrast, we preserve outliers and enable the detection of outliers in the perturbed data.
Tailored differential privacy is defined in [14] and aims to provide stronger -differential
privacy guarantees to outliers. We decided to evaluate the opposite by granting them less
protection since we see outliers as faulty systems or sensors one needs to detect.
3 Preliminaries
We model a database (or data set) D as a collection of records from Dn, i.e. D ∈
Dn, where each entry Di of D represents one participant’s information. The Hamming
distance dH(·, ·) between two databases x, y ∈ Dn is dH(x, y) = |{i : xi 6= yi}|,
i.e. the number of entries in which they differ. Databases x, y are called neighbors or
neighboring if dH(x, y) = 1.
Definition 1 (Differential Privacy). A perturbation mechanismM provides -differential
privacy if for all neighboring databases D1 and D2, and all S ⊆ Range(M),
Pr[M(D1) ∈ S] ≤ exp() · Pr[M(D2) ∈ S].
The protection for an individual in the database is measured by the privacy level .
While a small  offers higher protection for individuals involved in the computation of
a statistical function f , a larger  offers higher accuracy on f . In case an individual is
involved in a series of n statistical functions perturbed by a corresponding mechanism
Mi, where each function is requiring i, her protection is defined as  =
∑n
i=1 i by
the basic sequential composition theorem of Dwork et al. [3,16]. A data owner can limit
the privacy loss by specifying a maximum for  called privacy budget [4]. Depending
on the mutual agreement the exhaustion of the privacy budget can require the original
data to be destroyed as mentioned in [20] since the privacy guarantee no longer holds.
The noise level of M in differential privacy is dependent on the sensitivity of f .
For an overview of different notions of sensitivity with respect to the l1-metric see
Table 1. The global sensitivity GSf of a function f : Dn → Rk determines the worst-
case change that the omission or inclusion of a single individual’s data can have on f .
For example, if f is a counting query the removal of an individual can only change
the result by 1. GSf has to cover all neighboring databases, whereas local sensitivity
LSf (D) covers one fixed database instance D ∈ Dn and all its neighbors. In certain
Table 1. Comparison of different sensitivity notions
Global [4] GSf = max
D1,D2: dH (D1,D2)=1; D1,D2∈Dn
‖f(D1)− f(D2)‖1
Local LSf (D1) = max
D2: dH (D1,D2)=1; D2∈Dn
‖f(D1)− f(D2)‖1






cases databases with low local sensitivity can have neighbors with high local sensitiv-
ity, thereby allowing an attacker to distinguish them by the sensitivity-dependent noise
magnitude alone. In contrast, smooth sensitivity SSf (D) compares a fixed database in-
stance D with all other database instances but with respect to the distance between
them and a privacy parameter β.4 Using the notation from Table 1, the parameters
that differ in the various notions are: allowed distance between neighboring databases
D1, D2 (1 forGSf and LSf , unrestricted for SSf ) and choice of databasesD1 (a single
fixed database instance for LSf and SSf , unrestricted for GSf ). In Sect. 4 we intro-
duce a new notion of sensitivity, relaxed sensitivity, where the choice of databases is
generalized to allow the selection of a subgroup of all possible databases.
Two models for computation of a mechanism M have been suggested by [5]. In
the interactive model a data analyst receives noisy answers to functions evaluated on
unperturbed data D as long as the privacy budget is not exhausted. In contrast, the
original data D can be discarded in the non-interactive model by producing a sanitized
version D′ = M(D, f) of D and results are calculated with D′. While [17] assumes
that the majority of mechanisms utilize the interactive model the findings of [2] suggest
that D′ is inefficient but potentially useful for many classes of queries if computational
constraints are ignored. However, the non-interactive model also has its benefits: First,
there is no need for a curator who requires access to the sensitive D, analyzes and
permits queries and adjusts the privacy budget. Second, storage constrained sensors do
not need to retain D and instead release a locally sanitized D′. Third, the data owner
is not left with the administrative decision on how to handle exhausted privacy budgets
(e.g. destroy D or refresh budget periodically as discussed in [16, 21]).
4 Relaxed Differential Privacy
Differential privacy is a strong privacy guarantee due to its two worst-case assumptions:
the adversary is assumed to have complete knowledge about the data set except for a
single record and all possible data sets are covered by the guarantee. To relax differential
privacy one has to relax these assumptions. The first assumption was relaxed in [19] by
using a weaker but more realistic adversary and bounding the adversary’s prior and
posterior belief. In [17] the second assumption is relaxed by their notion of smooth
4 SSf needs to be a smooth upper bound S as defined in [17], i.e. ∀D ∈ Dn : S(D) ≥ LSf (D)
and ∀D1, D2 ∈ Dn, dH(D1, D2) = 1 : S(D1) ≤ eβ · S(D2). These requirements can be
fulfilled by S(D) = GSf with β = 0. SSf , however, is the smallest function to satisfy these
requirements with β > 0.
sensitivity. We focused on the latter approach due to the fact that we are concerned with
the discovery of outliers: We do not need the guarantee to hold for all records equally.
4.1 Relaxed Sensitivity
Our following new notion of relaxed sensitivity allows for different privacy guarantees
for groups N (non-outliers), O (outliers) within a single dataset Dn = N ∪O.
Definition 2 (Relaxed sensitivity). Let Dn = N ∪ O then the relaxed sensitivity of a






In the following we abuse notation slightly and say that in the case that D consists
of multiple, independent columns the sensitivity and perturbation are calculated per
column and not the entire database at once. While local sensitivity only holds for one
fixed database instance the relaxed sensitivity covers all databases from the subset N .
Let LSXf , GS
X
f denote local and global sensitivity respectively over a database set X .
Theorem 1. Relaxed sensitivity compares to local and global sensitivity as follows:







where D ∈ N ⊆ Dn.
The proof is omitted due to space constraints. We will omit the dataset in the sensi-
tivity notation in the following when it is not explicitly needed. The privacy guarantee
is enforced by noise whose magnitude is controlled by privacy parameter  and the
sensitivity. We adapt the popular Laplace mechanism [5] to allow its invocation with
different sensitivity notions.
Definition 3 (Laplace mechanism). Given any function f : Dn → Rk, the Laplace
mechanism is defined as
ML(x, f(·), GSf/) = f(x) + (Y1, . . . , Yk)
where Yi are independent and identically distributed random variables drawn from the
Laplace distribution Laplace (GSf/).
To relax differential privacy, we will adapt the scaling parameter to RSf/, thus sam-
pling noise from Laplace (RSf/). We view a database as consisting of multiple columns
and the perturbation is performed per column: The Laplace mechanism receives a col-
umn, i.e. a vector, as input and outputs a perturbed vector.
Theorem 2. Let Dn = N ∪O and f be a function f : Dn → Rk. The Laplace mech-
anism ML(x, f,RSf/) preserves ′-differential privacy for x ∈ Dn and preserves
-differential privacy for x ∈ N , where ′ =  ·GSf/RSf ≥ .
The proof is omitted due to space limitations.
4.2 Approximation of Relaxed Sensitivity
We do not want to restrict the queries an analyst can perform in the non-interactive
model. Therefore, we choose to evaluate the identity function fid(x) = x for sensitivity
determination. The sensitivity for fid can be unbounded depending on the input domain.
In the following we assume elements inN to be bounded real numbers. With fid as our
function and boundedN , we can express the relaxed sensitivity as RSfid = max(N )−
min(N ), i.e. the gap between possible databases, that we seek to close. We see sensors
measurements as point coordinates and use the terms interchangeably.
With historical data and domain knowledge the approximation can be tailored more
precisely to individual data sets. With knowledge about what measurements can be
considered physically possible one can approximate a bound for N . We approximate
RSfid in the following with q-th percentiles ρq , q ∈ [0, 100] of D. We denote with po
the percentage of outliers in the data set – alternatively, it can be seen as a bound onN .
We set qmax = 100− po/2, qmin = 100− qmax, and approximate RSfid with
R̂Sfid = ρqmax(D)− ρqmin(D). (1)
For this approximation we assume the following characteristics regarding our datasets:
1. We define outliers as points on an outer layer surrounding non-outliers,
2. the percentage of outliers or a bound for N can be approximated,
3. the data set contains only one cluster.
Assumption 1 is also used in depth-based outlier detection algorithms. Regarding as-
sumption 2, one can learn the outlier percentage or bounds via historical data and the
range of plausible (i.e. non-faulty, physically possible) measurements. If multiple clus-
ters exists the data can be split in cluster groups thus fulfilling assumption 3. The split
is either performed by the data owner or a third party in a privacy-preserving manner
(see Sect. 2 for clustering approaches consuming a portion of ).
R̂Sf implicitly definesN ′, which is an estimation ofN . An estimation R̂Sf > RSf
leads to N ⊂ N ′, i.e. more elements than necessary are protected which does not de-
crease privacy for elements fromN . However, R̂Sf < RSf implicitly definesN ′ ⊂ N ,
i.e. elements in N\N ′ could suffer a privacy loss since they receive less noise than
needed. We want to stress that even for an inaccurate approximation, the non-outliers
are still protected and receive a privacy level of ′ =  · RSfid/R̂Sfid ≥  (see The-
orem 2). Furthermore, we correct errors introduced by the perturbation (or estimation
R̂Sf > RSf ). For this we classify and detect the errors based on their change in dis-
tance to the center after and before perturbation as described in the following sections.
5 Outliers and False Negative Types
Let foutlier be an outlier detection function foutlier : T → {1, . . . , |T |} which returns the
indices (i.e. row numbers) of T which are outliers. We will refer to outliers detected in
the unperturbed data set as outliers or O = foutlier(T ). When referring to the perturbed










(b) Outlier undetected due to
perturbation of other points.
(c) Outlier undetected due
to its perturbation.
Fig. 1. Types of false negatives after perturbation. Layers correspond to unperturbed data points.
define outliers as points on an outer layer surrounding a (denser) core similar to [18].
Our goal is to find a small subset containing O on the perturbed data without having
access to the original data. We perturb the data set with the adapted Laplace mechanism
using approximated relaxed sensitivity per column. For well-separated outliers and non-
outliers and with our relaxed sensitivity notion O and O′ can be equal. However, this
is not necessarily the case and therefore we present a correction algorithm in Sect. 6 to
find the false negatives i.e. missing outliers from O that are not in O′. The presumed
outliers in O′ can be separated in two sets: false positives, i.e. presumed outliers in O′
that are not in O and true positives, i.e. outliers in O that are also in T ′.
We distinguish between two different types of false negatives visualized in Fig. 1.
Non-outliers lie in the core layer, outliers in the outlier layer and the empty border layer
separates the two. The layers for the unperturbed data differ from the perturbed layers
which are omitted in Fig. 1. The two types of false negatives can occur as follows: First,
a non-outlier can become a cover point after perturbation, i.e. “cover” a real outlier to
produce a false negative as shown in Fig. 1b. Second, an outlier can also become a false
negative on its own when it lands in a non-outlier region after perturbation, e.g. a dense
core as in Fig. 1c, where it will not be detected in the perturbed data.
6 Relaxed Differentially Private Outlier Detection & Correction
Given the data T ′, a relaxed differentially private version of T , we want to find the
outliers corresponding to the unperturbed T . We use the semi-honest model introduced
in [9] where corrupted protocol participants do not deviate from the protocol but gather
everything created during the run of the protocol. (e.g. message transcripts, temporary
memory). Furthermore, we assume that only one participant can be corrupted; an alter-
native assumption is that participants do not share their knowledge. The assumption that
parties do not share their knowledge is similar to the interactive model of differential
privacy, i.e. different analysts do not collaborate by combining their privacy budgets.
In the following we view data sets as consisting of two columns, one column per
measured attribute. Let T , T ′ be the unperturbed resp. perturbed data set. For the pertur-
bation each column receives independently drawn noise from the Laplace mechanism
with approximated relaxed sensitivity. We use sets of indices corresponding to rows in
T and T ′. This is convenient since an index identifies the same point before and after
perturbation. Let I be the set of indices from T (and thereby also T ′). We denote with
T [i] the row at index i ∈ I and with T [, j] the selection of column j. Recall that we
denote with O the set of all indices corresponding to rows with outliers in T detected
by foutlier, i.e. O = foutlier(T ), and with O′ the set of all presumed outlier indices from
T ′. As before, false negatives are missing outliers from O that are not found in O′,
false positives are presumed outliers in O′ that are not in O, and true positives are out-
liers in O that are also in O′. We denote the Euclidean distance of two points c, x as
d(c, x) = dc(x) where c is the center of T , determined by averaging each column.
Definition 4 (Distance Difference ddiff). The distance difference between a point in T
and T ′ at index i and the center c after and before perturbation respectively is
ddiff[i] = dc(T ′[i])− dc(T [i]).
We denote with wO the width of the outlier layer (visualized in Fig. 1) in the unper-
turbed data T . We denote with FNLj a set of indices for different layers j ∈ {1, 2, 3}
of presumed false negatives. These are spatial layers based on the false negative types
of Fig. 1 used in the correction phase.
6.1 Correction Algorithm
Our goal is to detect presumed outliers on relaxed differentially private data T ′, find the
undetected false negatives and remove additionally detected false positives. The algo-
rithm presented in Fig. 2 operates as follows: Each sensor S has as input the data set T ,
the privacy parameter  and approximated relaxed sensitivities R̂Sfid,j for each data col-
umn j. The correction server CS has as input the outlier layer width wO. The values for
R̂Sfid,j and wO are determined with historical data, i.e. knowledge about past outliers,
and bounds for the non-outliers, e.g. normal, non-faulty measurement values for sen-
sors. S scales the data in line 1a and generates the perturbed data set T ′ via perturbation
of each column j with the adapted Laplace mechanism parameterized with R̂Sfid,j/.
Then it sends T ′ to the analyst A and the distance differences ddiff to the correction
server CS . In line 3 the server CS filters O′ in two sets FP and T P for presumed false
positives and true positives respectively. The filtering is based on comparison of ddiff
against a threshold – the distance difference with the biggest change between sorted
distance differences. We use the fact that false positives, i.e. non-outliers that were de-
tected as outliers in the perturbed set, have a higher distance difference, i.e. receive
more noise, than true positives when non-outliers and outliers are well-separated. We
do not want to remove true positives (actual outliers) under any circumstances. Thus,
we err on the side of removing not enough false positives if the separation between out-
liers and non-outliers is low. In line 4 we reduce the set of indices to check for potential
false negatives. Without the reduction true negatives can land in FNLj , since they have
the same distance difference (ddiff) but not the same core distance (dc) as false negative
candidates. The server CS detects false negatives in line 5, i.e. outliers not contained in
O′, in three spatial layers FNL1, FNL2, and FNL3, where the first corresponds to
the false negative type from Fig. 1c and the latter to 1b. The use of two layers FNL2
and FNL3 for one false negative type is due to the row reduction and a simplification
for FNL2 explained in the following.
Input: Each sensor Sid has data T , privacy level  and approximated relaxed sensitivities
R̂Sfid,j per column j. Correction server CS has outlier layer width wO of sensor domain.
1. Each sensor Sid
(a) Scales each column T [, j]: subtraction of mean and division of standard deviation.
(b) Perturbs each column to T ′[, j] = ML(T [, j], fid, R̂Sfid,j/) and sends its id
and perturbed data, i.e. (id, T ′), to analyst A.
(c) Calculates the data center c by averaging every dimension, calculates the distance
differences ddiff = dc(T ′)− dc(T ) and sends (id, ddiff) to correction server CS.
2. Analyst A performs standard outlier detection on T ′ to get the list O′ of presumed
outliers indices and sends (id, O′) to CS.
3. Correction Server CS
(a) Calculates the threshold index t for the biggest change between ascending ddiff
values of presumed outliers: t = argmaxjk∈J ddiff[jk+1] − ddiff[jk] where
J = {j1, j2, . . . } are the indices from O′ sorted according to ascending ddiff
values. (For convenience we define jk+1 = jk for k + 1 > |J |.)
(b) Separates indices via t into false positives FP = {i ∈ O′ | ddiff[i] > ddiff[t]} and
true positives T P = O′\FP and calculates dT P = min
i∈T P
ddiff[i].
(c) Sends (id, dT P , dT P + wO) to A.
4. Analyst A creates
I2 = {i ∈ I\O′ | dc(T ′[i]) ≥ dT P},
I3 = {i ∈ I\O′ | dc(T ′[i]) ≥ dT P + wO},
and sends (id, I2, I3) to CS.
5. Correction Server CS creates false negatives layer sets
FNL1 = {i ∈ I\O′ | ddiff[i] < 0},
FNL2 = {i ∈ I2 | 0 ≤ ddiff[i] ≤ dT P},
FNL3 = {i ∈ I3 | dT P ≤ ddiff[i] ≤ dT P + wO}.
Output: CS outputs (id, T P , FNL1, FNL2, FNL3) to DO.
Fig. 2. Algorithm for correction of outlier detection.
The inequalities are based on the unperturbed position of outliers in respect to non-
outliers (i.e. on an outer, less dense layer) and the distance difference after perturbation.
The reasoning for FNL1 is that non-outliers, who are by definition closer to the cen-
ter c, are distanced further away from c after perturbation due to the noise magnitude.
Whereas outliers, who are already further away, can reduce their distance to the cen-
ter as seen in Fig. 1c. Hence, we look for indices i fulfilling ddiff[i] < 0. The idea
behind FNL2 is a simplification that all outliers lie on the same “orbit” around the cen-
ter (same center distance). In this case the minimal distance difference ddiff to become
a true positive is the minimal ddiff one can find from the set of presumed true posi-
tives T P , i.e. dT P = min
t∈T P
(ddiff[t]). Only unperturbed outliers with a ddiff greater than
dT P could be detected as an outlier after perturbation. Hence, the remaining undetected
have ddiff larger than 0 (otherwise they land in FNL1) but smaller than dT P . However,
not all outliers do lie on the same orbit. Therefore, we collect in FNL3 indices with
distance difference greater than dT P . We also know that no undetected outlier’s dis-
tance difference can be greater than the distance difference of false positives in FP ,
i.e. dFP = min
f∈FP
(ddiff[f ]). More precise is the outlier layer width wO (line 4).
6.2 Privacy of the Correction Algorithm
The server CS knows the distance difference for points at a given index i, i.e. ddiff[i], but
CS does not know which perturbed point is identified by i since this knowledge remains
at the analyst A. The only information CS sends to A is dT P , wO, i.e. information re-
garding outliers which we like to detect. Even ifA had access to all outlier information,
including the noise used to perturb them, it would not lessen the protection of non-
outliers. In exchange A sends CS IL2, IL3, i.e. sets of indices j of perturbed points
with dc(T ′[j]) ≥ dT P and dc(T ′[j]) ≥ dT P +wO respectively. However, CS does not
know which points correspond to these indices. IfA and CS were to collaborate (i.e. not
semi-honest) they could only narrow down the possible origin of a perturbed point. The
information collaborating servers could learn can be reduced by using frequency-hiding
order-preserving encryption as presented in [12] for the distance differences. Secure
computation is not practical for our scenario (e.g. computation constrained IoT sensors)
due to the bidirectional communication – although the communication complexity can
be seen as almost independent of the network performance as shown in [13].
7 Outlier Detection Evaluation
We compared detected outliers on the original data with presumed outliers found on the
perturbed data. Our algorithm was implemented in R 3.3.1 and run on a Apple MacBook
Pro (Intel Core i7-4870HQ CPU, 16GB main memory). We selected DBSCAN [7] to
realize foutlier and used the fpc package implementation. DBSCAN utilizes density and
proximity of points, thus matching our spatial definition of the outlier topology where
the outliers lie on an outer layer surrounding a denser core. DBSCAN is parameterized
via eps for neighborhood reachability (point proximity and connections) and minPts
(threshold density within the reachable neighborhood). We used the same DBSCAN
parameters for the unperturbed and perturbed data. Our error correction logic only re-
quires between 30 and 40 milliseconds for 100,000 points. Four synthetic datasets were
created to examine the impact of varying separation between outliers and non-outliers
with the following characteristics: 100,000 points in R2 where each dimension is sam-
pled independently from a normal distribution with standard deviation 3 and mean 0.
Outlier percentage in the unperturbed data is 10%. After sampling the distances be-
tween outliers and non-outliers were increased to≈ 50, 120, 220, 400; we denote these
data sets with Separation 50, etc. These separation distances were chosen based on
decreasing probabilities that Laplace distributed noise preserves the outlier topology.
With accuracy we denote the percentage of all false negatives and true positives,
i.e. all outliers, found with our approach. Furthermore, subset size is the size of the


















































(b) Subset size as percentage of all points.
Fig. 3. Accuracy and subset size for synthetic data sets; mean of 5 runs with  ∈ {0.1, 0.5, 1}.
size for  ∈ {0.1, 0.5, 1} is shown in Fig. 3a and Fig. 3b respectively. The results for
 = 0.1 indicate that our correction algorithm achieves meaningful accuracy of ≈ 75%
for separation ≥ 220. However,  = 0.1 is a strong privacy guarantee and  ∈ {0.5, 1}
still offers meaningful protection. For  = 0.5 the found outlier percentage increases to
95–100% for all data sets. With a privacy guarantee of  = 1 our correction algorithm
is not always needed since the separation between outliers and non-outliers is preserved
even after perturbation. The subset size is always below 20% as is evident from Fig. 3b.
8 Conclusion
We implemented and evaluated an algorithm for detection of individual outliers on data
perturbed in the local, non-interactive model of differential privacy, which is especially
useful for IoT scenarios. We introduced a new notion of sensitivity, relaxed sensitivity,
to provide different differential privacy guarantees for outliers in comparison to non-
outliers. Furthermore, we presented a correction algorithm to detect false negatives and
false positives. In our experiments we detect 80% of outliers in a subset of 10% of all
points with a differential privacy value of  = 0.1 for data with well separated outliers.
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